Showing posts with label bankruptcy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label bankruptcy. Show all posts

Adding 55-65 year olds to Medicare: Compelling reasons (but won't lower cost)

In my third year of practice, I took on the care of a retired Ivy League professor and his wife. He retired at 65, and at his “exit interview” was told that he could purchase the “Medicare family plan” for his wife – who had multiple preexisting conditions.

Of course, there is no Medicare family plan – and the university ended up leaving his wife on its medical plan until she qualified for Medicare at age 65.  But I think of this story often.  It’s hard for people between 55 and 65 to get insurance on their own –and when they lose their jobs (or if their spouse provided insurance and s/he retires), they can find themselves uninsured just when they start having serious medical problems and worrisome medical bills. 

So, from a public policy point of view, I like the idea of a Medicare “buy in” for people 55 and over who don’t have access to employer-based (or other) health insurance.

I’ve been thinking about whether this is likely to lower the overall cost of health care – since that’s the point of this blog. 

Here are ways that allowing those over 55 to “buy in” to Medicare could change the overall cost of health care:

1)      55-65 year olds newly-eligible for Medicare would have insurance, and those with insurance have better health and fewer years of potential life lost.  They see physicians and obtain medical care more than the uninsured. This means that Medicare would see less “pent up demand” when people turn 65.  BUT –it’s always more expensive to have people insured than have them out in the cold.   Alas, there is not likely to be savings from the cost-effective (not cost-saving) health care these 55-65 year olds received because they were insured. So  - score one for social benefit – but not one for cost containment.

2)      Medicare pays hospitals and physicians lower fees than most employer-sponsored health plans (but more than most state Medicaid programs). So, the care delivered to these 55-65 year olds would have lower unit costs.  This could help lower overall costs.  However, if providers simply ‘shift costs’ and raise private insurance rates to cover this new shortfall, aggregate health spending would not go down.


3)      Medicare generally has lower administrative cost than the private sector.  Adding 55-65 year olds on a voluntary basis but with some qualification requirements would increase Medicare administrative costs a bit . Further, those over 65 have their Medicare premiums deducted directly from their Social Security payments – and this new addition would mean Medicare would have to contract for billing services.   If these 55-65 year olds were coming to Medicare from private insurance, there would be some administrative savings. If they were coming from the rolls of the uninsured, the administrative costs would actually be higher (since the cost of administering insurance to the uninsured is zero).

I do see a big risk selection issue likely in voluntary enrollment in Medicare for uninsured 55-65 year olds.  For one thing, those who are eligible for employer based insurance are likely a bit healthier – so those eligible to buy in to Medicare are likely to have higher burden of illness.  Further, a voluntary system tends to attract adverse selection. Therefore, it might be hard for this program to pay for itself if the beneficiaries were paying the full cost (since with adverse selection each successive year the premiums go up and more healthy people drop out, a phenomenon fondly referred to as a “death spiral.” )


Employers have been getting out of retiree health insurance   for some time,   and Medicare eligibility would likely accelerate that.   Paradoxically, if more of the older, sicker early retirees went to Medicare, this could lower health insurance premiums for employers and their employees. But this would not be lowering health care cost overall – it would be shifting some of the higher risks on to the federal program.


(click on graphic to enlarge)

The increased administrative costs of adding this new population to Medicare and the potential of adverse selection are serious concerns.   Some sort of individual mandate would go a long way to preventing a ‘death spiral’ of this type of a program

There is a big social benefit to being sure that 55-65 year olds can be insured.  The ability to buy in to Medicare could make this group feel more comfortable changing jobs or taking a risk, and it would mean fewer medical bankruptcies going forward.   

It doesn’t seem to me that this initiative is likely to lower overall health care costs.  There are compelling reasons to offer Medicare to 55-65 year olds who cannot otherwise obtain insurance.  Lowering overall health care costs is not one of the compelling reasons.

When You Have Skin in the Game, it Can Pinch

Just in time for Thanksgiving, the New York Times  has served up a half dozen personal stories of bankruptcies brought on by medical expenses.   This article brings faces to statistics published earlier this year – showing that 61% of personal bankruptcies are associated with medical debt.


What’s the underlying problem here?

For starters, the costs of health care have more than doubled in 7 years – and a routine hospitalization of just a few days is often billed at well over $10,000 – a quarter of all annual income for a family of four at the federal poverty level.   Few can afford to pay medical bills if they are uninsured.

Further, the nature of employer-sponsored health insurance has changed. To cope with the large increases in cost, many employers have shifted substantial costs to their employees. Everyone sees this in higher copayments for office visits and medications – but in addition there is a move toward higher deductibles and more coinsurance. Copayments are fixed fees – whereas coinsurance means that the patient is responsible for a percentage of the allowed bills.   The average amount of hospital coinsurance is 18%.  Even when plans have an out of pocket maximum, certain costs (like out of network costs) do not count toward this maximum. 

For the “average” employee this works out fine, and health savings or health reimbursement accounts can be a great boon for those who are healthy, and those who can afford to put their own funds in tax-advantaged accounts.  But for those with serious illness, coinsurance can be ruinous.   Most of the stories told in the Times today were of those who had insurance – but were startled to find that having insurance did not offer them financial security. 

"Skin in the game" is the phrase used to describe individuals' bearing a substantial share of the cost of health care  - and there is evidence that this helps keep people from consuming too much 'low value' health care.  All insurance creates 'moral hazard,' where people make different demands than they would make if they were paying their own dollars.

On the other hand, we do consume health care differently than other goods and services, and none of the bankruptcies in the NYT article involved discretionary, 'low value' care.  There are many academicians and policymakers who doubt that "moral hazard" is the driving issue in health care inflation. Here's a link to a Malcolm Gladwell 2005 New Yorker article on this topic.

Ironically, the NYT report comes from Tennessee, a state that tried to dramatically expand insurance to its residents in the 1990s through TennCare – a public-private program that included large expansions of Medicaid.  The program was shelved when the state ran short of cash – a cautionary tale of expanding health insurance without adequate funding and appropriate cost control.  


Health Care Costs and Income Disparity

The McKinsey Global Institute recently published an analysis of the impact of health care costs on income disparity. (Registration Required) The study shows that only 11% of those with high income (over $130K) are not covered by employer health insurance, while this rises to 19% for high middle income ($58-130K), 43% for low middle income ($27-58K), and 78% with low income (<$27K). This does not include government-provided health insurance, such as Medicaid, for which only very low income individuals qualify.

Furthermore, employers pay twice as much for health insurance for their high income workers (top 10%) compared to their low income workers (bottom 30%). This means that high income individuals are more likely to have health insurance plans that provide robust coverage. Low income individuals, even if they have coverage, are more likely to have higher deductibles and coinsurance and copayments, while they are least likely to be able to afford these out of pocket payments. This is especially important since health care costs were reported to be a major cause of bankruptcy, even before the current “great recession.” (Comment on initial article)
























The McKinsey analysis reminds us that employer coverage of health care is almost universal for those with high incomes, and it is increasingly rare for those of low income. Furthermore, employers pay twice as much for health insurance for their high income workers (top 10%) compared to their low income workers (bottom 30%). This means that high income individuals are more likely to have health insurance plans that provide robust coverage. Low income individuals, even if they have coverage, are more likely to have higher deductibles and coinsurance and copayments, while they are least likely to be able to affort these out of pocket payments. This is especially important since health care costs were reported to be a major cause of bankruptcy, even before the current “great recession.”

See http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/abstract/hlthaff.w5.63
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/full/25/2/w74